ASEAN
28 November 2025
The Myth of the Asian Century
The idea of an “Asian Century" would be a myth, according to former Singaporean diplomat, Bilahari Kausikan.
How could the idea of an Asian Century be a myth, as argued by Bilahari Kausikan, when the region is playing a larger role in world affairs?
Bilahari, a Singaporean retired academic, diplomat and civil servant, argues in a new book, The Myth of the Asian Century, that it’s time to peel away the layers of a cliché that is not just useless, but harmful.
Bilahari sees the Asian century as a cliche, a trope, which is not particularly useful because it stops you thinking. He is irritated by cliches serving as a substitute for analysis.
The term “Asian Century” conceals greater complexity – complexities between Asian countries, and complexities on Asia's place in the world economy.
China tries to appropriate the term Asian Century for political purposes, to give the impression that the 21st century will be a Chinese century, following the "American Century” of the 20th century. The Asian Century is a seemingly benign version of Maoist slogan, “the East is rising, the West is declining”.
When China appropriates the term, Asian Century it can be harmful. China has done very well, but no country keeps growing forever. Moreover, very few Asian countries consider China a trusted friend, especially in light of China’s widespread influence operations.
In reality there is a lot more to the Asian Century than China – with Japan, India, the four dragons of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and Indonesia being important players.
Rather than an Asian Century, we have entered an age of multipolarity. In light of its diversity, Asia is naturally multipolar. A decoupling of Asia from the world economy is not plausible.
Indeed, there are now more connections across regions. The UK has joined the CPTPP, or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement. The European Union is thinking of joining. Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are taking an interest in NATO.
In sum, old divisions are breaking down. We are in an era of dynamic multipolarity. Different coalitions of countries will form around different issues.
Bilahari argues that it is not a question of whether but when Japan and South Korea get nuclear weapons. This will be a response to China modernising its nuclear weapons, not merely US unreliability.
Southeast Asia is adjusting to a new reality with Trump. Bilahari notes that America’s engagement with the world was always sporadic until it was attacked on its own soil in Pearl Harbour.
After that it faced an existential threat from the Soviet Union. For a 40-year period (the “American Century”), there was a period of contention over the political and economic system, domestic and international.
Today, America faces no existential threat. All countries have mixed economies. China is a formidable competitor. Russia is dangerous. But they are not existential threats to the US.
Notwithstanding its reorientation under Donald Trump, the US will remain an important player in Asia. It has critical interests in Asia. The US is defining its interests in East Asia more transactionally.
Indeed, it has redefined the terms of its engagement with the world. Trump is not in retreat, he is flexing his muscles in a very brazen way.
Every country in the world puts itself first. But the US used to define its interests broadly and generously. Now it's defining its interest more narrowly and more transactionally.
Southeast Asia is used to the US. Half a century ago the US left Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But the US did not leave the region, it just shifted the terms of engagement from direct intervention on the ground to being an offshore balancer.
China's rise has also aroused anxieties across the region. One way to balance China is working with the US. So countries will find some way to work with the US.
China is not eager to use force to incorporate Taiwan into the motherland. It would be an immense gamble, especially for the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. Bilahari is most concerned with Taiwan’s sense of entitlement to defence by Western countries because it is a democracy and it makes advanced semiconductors.
Trump’s Asia policy seems to be a broad continuation from previous administrations. But the US is going to think longer and harder about how and whether it intervenes and what's in it for them if it intervenes in Asia and that will include Taiwan.
Bilahari argues that while nationalism has a bad connotation in Europe, it has been by and large a positive force in Asia and in Southeast Asia. This is a very complicated region and the fact is despite ASEAN and so on, we don't particularly trust each other for a variety of historical and cultural reasons.
But one value we all share is the value of autonomy, which is a nationalist value. And that has led us to a conclusion many years ago that if we don't hang together, we are all going to hang separately. So, we have to hang together minimally and that's the meaning of ASEAN right now – regionalism based on nationalism even though it sounds like a contradiction in terms. The EU is based on a different conception of regionalism.
We all have identities and national identity is a big part of everybody's identity. The power of nationalism will frustrate China’s ambitions. China will always enjoy substantive influence in Southeast and East Asia by virtue of its size, proximity and weight. But for precisely those same reasons it is always going to arouse anxieties. So countries are going to balance by working more with each other, and by finding a way to work with the US, even minimally.
China will have a sphere of influence but it's probably going to be confined to Laos and Cambodia, maybe bits of Thailand. There is no love lost between the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, and the Chinese, they don't trust each other. In fact there's no love lost between the North Koreans and the Chinese. The North Koreans trust the Chinese less than they do the Americans.
Bilahari, a Singaporean retired academic, diplomat and civil servant, argues in a new book, The Myth of the Asian Century, that it’s time to peel away the layers of a cliché that is not just useless, but harmful.
Bilahari sees the Asian century as a cliche, a trope, which is not particularly useful because it stops you thinking. He is irritated by cliches serving as a substitute for analysis.
The term “Asian Century” conceals greater complexity – complexities between Asian countries, and complexities on Asia's place in the world economy.
China tries to appropriate the term Asian Century for political purposes, to give the impression that the 21st century will be a Chinese century, following the "American Century” of the 20th century. The Asian Century is a seemingly benign version of Maoist slogan, “the East is rising, the West is declining”.
When China appropriates the term, Asian Century it can be harmful. China has done very well, but no country keeps growing forever. Moreover, very few Asian countries consider China a trusted friend, especially in light of China’s widespread influence operations.
In reality there is a lot more to the Asian Century than China – with Japan, India, the four dragons of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and Indonesia being important players.
Rather than an Asian Century, we have entered an age of multipolarity. In light of its diversity, Asia is naturally multipolar. A decoupling of Asia from the world economy is not plausible.
Indeed, there are now more connections across regions. The UK has joined the CPTPP, or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement. The European Union is thinking of joining. Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand are taking an interest in NATO.
In sum, old divisions are breaking down. We are in an era of dynamic multipolarity. Different coalitions of countries will form around different issues.
Bilahari argues that it is not a question of whether but when Japan and South Korea get nuclear weapons. This will be a response to China modernising its nuclear weapons, not merely US unreliability.
Southeast Asia is adjusting to a new reality with Trump. Bilahari notes that America’s engagement with the world was always sporadic until it was attacked on its own soil in Pearl Harbour.
After that it faced an existential threat from the Soviet Union. For a 40-year period (the “American Century”), there was a period of contention over the political and economic system, domestic and international.
Today, America faces no existential threat. All countries have mixed economies. China is a formidable competitor. Russia is dangerous. But they are not existential threats to the US.
Notwithstanding its reorientation under Donald Trump, the US will remain an important player in Asia. It has critical interests in Asia. The US is defining its interests in East Asia more transactionally.
Indeed, it has redefined the terms of its engagement with the world. Trump is not in retreat, he is flexing his muscles in a very brazen way.
Every country in the world puts itself first. But the US used to define its interests broadly and generously. Now it's defining its interest more narrowly and more transactionally.
Southeast Asia is used to the US. Half a century ago the US left Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But the US did not leave the region, it just shifted the terms of engagement from direct intervention on the ground to being an offshore balancer.
China's rise has also aroused anxieties across the region. One way to balance China is working with the US. So countries will find some way to work with the US.
China is not eager to use force to incorporate Taiwan into the motherland. It would be an immense gamble, especially for the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. Bilahari is most concerned with Taiwan’s sense of entitlement to defence by Western countries because it is a democracy and it makes advanced semiconductors.
Trump’s Asia policy seems to be a broad continuation from previous administrations. But the US is going to think longer and harder about how and whether it intervenes and what's in it for them if it intervenes in Asia and that will include Taiwan.
Bilahari argues that while nationalism has a bad connotation in Europe, it has been by and large a positive force in Asia and in Southeast Asia. This is a very complicated region and the fact is despite ASEAN and so on, we don't particularly trust each other for a variety of historical and cultural reasons.
But one value we all share is the value of autonomy, which is a nationalist value. And that has led us to a conclusion many years ago that if we don't hang together, we are all going to hang separately. So, we have to hang together minimally and that's the meaning of ASEAN right now – regionalism based on nationalism even though it sounds like a contradiction in terms. The EU is based on a different conception of regionalism.
We all have identities and national identity is a big part of everybody's identity. The power of nationalism will frustrate China’s ambitions. China will always enjoy substantive influence in Southeast and East Asia by virtue of its size, proximity and weight. But for precisely those same reasons it is always going to arouse anxieties. So countries are going to balance by working more with each other, and by finding a way to work with the US, even minimally.
China will have a sphere of influence but it's probably going to be confined to Laos and Cambodia, maybe bits of Thailand. There is no love lost between the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, and the Chinese, they don't trust each other. In fact there's no love lost between the North Koreans and the Chinese. The North Koreans trust the Chinese less than they do the Americans.