平和
和平
평화
ASIA
26 March 2014
The idea of Asia

The idea of Asia

We recently had the opportunity to discuss with Sven Saaler, from Tokyo's Sophia University, his work on Pan-Asianism. Saaler had many important insights to share with us.

We recently had the opportunity to discuss with Sven Saaler, from Tokyo's Sophia University, his work on Pan-Asianism. Saaler had many important insights to share with us, based on his mammoth two volume collection, "Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History", with Christopher W. A. Szpilman.

The complexity of the issues are immediately evident when we learn that the word “Asia” originated in ancient Greece in the fifth century BC. In other words, the idea of Asia is European, not Asian in origin. And there is still no consensus on where Asia starts and finishes.

Asia originally denoted the lands of the Persian Empire extending east of the Bosphorus Straits. It then developed into a general term used by Europeans to describe all the lands lying to the east of Europe. However, the connotation was that Asia was a threat to Europe, the latter being smaller in area, much less populous, poorer, and far less significant than Asia in terms of global history.

We would have to wait until the sixteenth century for the word Asia to arrive in East Asia, being introduced by Jesuit missionaries like Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), one of the founders of the Jesuit mission in China. But it then took two more centuries for Asia to be widely used in the region itself, rather than being just a technical term used by East Asian cartographers. Threat was once again a factor.

The term Asia came into common use in East Asia in the mid-nineteenth century in response to the increasing diplomatic, military, and economic presence of Western powers in East Asia. The Opium War of 1839–1842 was a watershed in the history of Asian/European encounters. The British victory led to the recognition throughout East Asia of Europe as a common threat.

It was at that time that an increasing number of intellectuals, politicians, and activists throughout Asia argued in favor of strengthening “Asian” solidarity in relation to “the West”. Asia came to represent a specific geopolitical space. It was a continent bound together by such commonalities like a shared history, close cultural links, a long record of diplomatic relations, trade exchanges, and the notion of a common destiny.

Pan-Asian cooperation was institutionalized in the form of numerous pan-Asian associations founded all over the continent. It was also reflected in pan-Asian conferences that took place in Japan, China, and Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s.

The transnational character of Pan-Asianism was also apparent in its publishing activities. Indian pan-Asianists published material in Japan, China, the United States, and Germany; Japanese pan-Asianists published in China, India, and the United States. Koreans, too, such as the court noble An Kyongsu (1853–1900), published their works in Japan. Journals with a clear pan-Asian message were published in Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.

The Japanese triumph in the war with Russia in 1904–1905 was an important turning point, an event that accelerated the spread of pan-Asian ideas throughout the continent. Many Asians believed that Japan would soon assume leadership in the struggle against the tyranny of the Western imperialist powers.

But Pan-Asianism was then discredited as Japan used this ideology to legitimize war and colonial rule over Asian countries and peoples. While Japanese rulers insisted they were more “benevolent” than Western colonial rulers, because Japanese were fellow Asians, research shows that Japanese colonial rule was just as oppressive as that of any European power.

Japan’s surrender at the end of World War 2 and the advent of the Cold War resulted in the disappearance of pan-Asian ideals from the international relations arena. Japanese proponents of Pan-Asianism were purged from office, and pan-Asian associations were disbanded by the occupation authorities. Pan-Asianism no longer figured in debates on foreign relations, in Japan or elsewhere.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 produced a surge of interest in issues of regionalism and transnational identity in contemporary East Asia. And despite the strong priority given by the Japanese government to the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has been a driving force of Asian regionalism, especially in the economic sphere. Notable developments have been the creation of the Asian Development Bank (before the end of the Cold War), the 1997 proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund, and the widespread cooperation under the ASEAN+3 umbrella, involving the South East Asian (ASEAN) nations plus China, Japan, and Korea.

While we can celebrate Saaler's excellent research, Pan-Asianism has taken an unfortunate turn over the past decade or so. The rise of China, the growing self confidence of Korea, and economic stagnation and troubled leadership in Japan have led to tensions and rivalries between these countries, which threaten Pan-Asian ideals in North East Asia. It is ironical because these three countries are Asia's most economically powerful, have much to gain from closer economic cooperation, and share many cultural attributes. It is even more ironical that Asian cooperation is most advanced among the South East Asian countries of ASEAN, despite their immense economic, cultural and political diversity.

For any regional cooperation to work, it requires reconciliation. As Tony Blair has recently argued, history shows that reconciliation happens "when the sense of shared opportunity is greater than the separate sense of grievance". Regrettably, too many leaders in North East Asia still dwell on and exploit past grievances for domestic politics.  They do not yet see a sense of shared opportunity as being greater than the separate sense of grievance.

And as Europe has shown through its sovereign debt crisis, regional cooperation also requires a sincere willingness and determination to work together and find shared solutions. The challenges of responding to natural disasters and transboundary diseases are just two examples which provide Asians with plenty of opportunities of working together. Regrettably, the cases of successful cooperation are still too few.

The future of Pan-Asianism will be interesting to observe over the coming decades. The many varieties of Pan-Asianism had in common their opposition to the West’s presence in Asia, opposition to Western culture and values, and also an emphasis on the importance of Asian culture and Asian values.

But today, Western countries that border the Pacific Ocean are now being rapidly "Asianized" as Asian migrants now account for a growing share of their populations. Asian-Canadians make up 15% of Canada's population, while 12% of Australia's population comes from Asia, and 6% of American's is Asian. And these Asian population are concentrated on the Pacific coast, with Vancouver's 40% Asian population and San Francisco's 35% being perhaps the most striking cases.

It is also worth noting that the most successful examples of Asian cooperation are those which have an Asia-Pacific scope, such as the Asian Development Bank, APEC, East Asia Summit, and the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations. And the responses to natural disasters like Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, and the 2011 earthquake/tsunami/nuclear crisis in Japan also highlight the value of Asia-Pacific cooperation.

It is thus quite possible that over time Pan-Asianism could lose its raison d'etre, and a Pan Asia-Pacific identity take greater hold. Only time will tell.

Author

John West
Executive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com
Tags: asia, pan-asianism, asian history, asian cooperation, asian rivalry, sven saaler

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