JAPAN
25 March 2014
Japan's nuclear madness
"Two years after the 2011 disaster, we are building a new future", says Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.Honto desu ka? Really?
"Two years after the 2011 disaster, we are building a new future", says Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a new PR campaign
Honto desu ka? Really? Is it really true?
This PR hype does not sit well with a recent report of the Australian newspaper that "the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant remains critically vulnerable to a new quake or tsunami two years after the tragedy, and clean-up operations have been marred by corruption and gross workplace safety violations ...".
"... nuclear workers ... said they had received massive undocumented exposures to radiation, and the danger money supposed to flow to employees for working at Fukushima Daiichi was being creamed off by unscrupulous companies."
"Japan's nuclear industry is desperate to avoid admitting the earthquake (rather than the tsunami) crippled the (Fukushima) reactor as it would necessitate tough new measures to strengthen the remaining plants. With all but two of the 50 remaining nuclear reactors out of commission out of safety fears, the government of Japan and its nuclear-dependent utilities are posting huge financial losses because of soaring liquefied natural gas import costs."
In short, it seems clear that the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is failing to heed the conclusions of the report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission which highlights the deep and systemic governance problems of Japan's nuclear industry. Indeed, the Australian reports that "Last month TEPCO was forced to apologize for blocking parliamentary investigators from inspecting reactor No 1 on the spurious grounds that it was too dark inside the well-lit reactor building".
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. Rather, it was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
The first point that the Commission emphasized was Japanese culture:
"... this was a disaster “Made in Japan”. Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity. Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident, the result may well have been the same."
Japan's nuclear energy was developed behind closed doors, without open democratic scrutiny:
"Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle. With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion."
Japan did not take interest in or learn from the experiences of other countries:
"At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not invented here.’ ... Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents. It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant."
The first responsibility of Japanese bureaucrats is to his ministry, rather than the nation:
"This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organization. Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety."
Since this mindset can be found across Japan, this tragic event has lessons for all Japanese citizens:
"... each and every Japanese citizen should reflect very deeply ... on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society ... we hope this initiative (report) can contribute to the development of Japan’s civil society."
It is of course true that many of the conclusions of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission would also apply to some extent to all countries. But in Japan these characteristics are more pronounced and ingrained.
Further, every country experiences large scale disasters, like Hurricane Katrina in the US, or the global financial crisis. The key thing is to learn from them for the future.
But despite the harsh and devastating conclusions of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, TEPCO and the Japanese government are clearly refusing to learn lessons from its nuclear crisis.
Shinzo Abe has made an impressive beginning to his prime ministership. But he will need to rely more on serious action, especially against entrenched bureaucrats and the nuclear industry, rather than resorting to hype about a "New Japan".
Executive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com
Honto desu ka? Really? Is it really true?
This PR hype does not sit well with a recent report of the Australian newspaper that "the crippled Fukushima nuclear plant remains critically vulnerable to a new quake or tsunami two years after the tragedy, and clean-up operations have been marred by corruption and gross workplace safety violations ...".
"... nuclear workers ... said they had received massive undocumented exposures to radiation, and the danger money supposed to flow to employees for working at Fukushima Daiichi was being creamed off by unscrupulous companies."
"Japan's nuclear industry is desperate to avoid admitting the earthquake (rather than the tsunami) crippled the (Fukushima) reactor as it would necessitate tough new measures to strengthen the remaining plants. With all but two of the 50 remaining nuclear reactors out of commission out of safety fears, the government of Japan and its nuclear-dependent utilities are posting huge financial losses because of soaring liquefied natural gas import costs."
In short, it seems clear that the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is failing to heed the conclusions of the report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission which highlights the deep and systemic governance problems of Japan's nuclear industry. Indeed, the Australian reports that "Last month TEPCO was forced to apologize for blocking parliamentary investigators from inspecting reactor No 1 on the spurious grounds that it was too dark inside the well-lit reactor building".
The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. Rather, it was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response.
The first point that the Commission emphasized was Japanese culture:
"... this was a disaster “Made in Japan”. Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity. Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who bear responsibility for this accident, the result may well have been the same."
Japan's nuclear energy was developed behind closed doors, without open democratic scrutiny:
"Following the 1970s “oil shocks,” Japan accelerated the development of nuclear power in an effort to achieve national energy security. As such, it was embraced as a policy goal by government and business alike, and pursued with the same single-minded determination that drove Japan’s postwar economic miracle. With such a powerful mandate, nuclear power became an unstoppable force, immune to scrutiny by civil society. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion."
Japan did not take interest in or learn from the experiences of other countries:
"At a time when Japan’s self-confidence was soaring, a tightly knit elite with enormous financial resources had diminishing regard for anything ‘not invented here.’ ... Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents. It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant."
The first responsibility of Japanese bureaucrats is to his ministry, rather than the nation:
"This conceit was reinforced by the collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy, by which the first duty of any individual bureaucrat is to defend the interests of his organization. Carried to an extreme, this led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety."
Since this mindset can be found across Japan, this tragic event has lessons for all Japanese citizens:
"... each and every Japanese citizen should reflect very deeply ... on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society ... we hope this initiative (report) can contribute to the development of Japan’s civil society."
It is of course true that many of the conclusions of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission would also apply to some extent to all countries. But in Japan these characteristics are more pronounced and ingrained.
Further, every country experiences large scale disasters, like Hurricane Katrina in the US, or the global financial crisis. The key thing is to learn from them for the future.
But despite the harsh and devastating conclusions of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, TEPCO and the Japanese government are clearly refusing to learn lessons from its nuclear crisis.
Shinzo Abe has made an impressive beginning to his prime ministership. But he will need to rely more on serious action, especially against entrenched bureaucrats and the nuclear industry, rather than resorting to hype about a "New Japan".
Author
John WestExecutive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com